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Abstract. People seem to learn tasks even without formal training. This can be modelled as
the outcome of a feedback system that accumulates experience. In this paper we investigate
such a feedback system, following an iterative research approach. A feedback loop is spec-
iﬁed that is detailed using contemporary ideas on human behaviour. The resulting model
is investigated in an empirical study. Finally, we consider a computational mechanism to
explain the results. This approach is aimed at understanding how a feedback mechanism
might work rather than at observing its outcomes. In this paper, we study the approach
through adjustments in card selections in a game consisting of repeated card choices. Play-
ing this game, participants do not know what rules determine gains and losses. Therefore
there is some tension between exploring the options and achieving immediate proﬁt. To
decide in such situations it is argued that often evaluations below the level of conscious
awareness, such as affect, play an important role. The results support the hypothesis that
participants would draw better cards as the game progressed. There is some evidence that
emotions are involved, since the hypothesis that proﬁt and emotions are correlated is con-
ﬁrmed. Further evidence that formal logic is not sufﬁcient follows from the observed effects
of music on card selections. In the second part of the paper the aim is to understand the
results from a computational point of view. Four possible ways of integrating feedback into
a decision criterion are compared. Using one of these mechanisms, a computational model
is investigated that might describe the role of music in card selection. Although there are
limitations to both the empirical and computational ﬁndings, the chosen approach indi-
cates that computational modelling of experiential appraisal, at a preconscious level, and
the effect of external factors, such as music, is in principle feasible, and can lead to a
research agenda aimed at understanding such phenomena.
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1. Introduction
When a complex application such as Microsoft Word is ﬁrst installed on the com-
puter, most users can probably only operate simple functions, such as typing plain
text. After a while, some users discover more about the rationale and functional-
ity of the application, which allows them to make better use of the options of the
program.
This example indicates that interaction processes change with experience. These
changes can be explained if some kind of guidance system is assumed that
optimises user interaction with experience (Carver and Scheier, 1998). Such a
guidance system allows users to interact in the best possible way, based on the
available knowledge of the interaction process. The guidance system accumulates
more information about ongoing interaction as it progresses. With this increased
knowledge, future interactions can be improved.
The aim of this paper is to explore how a feedback control system for such
improvements can be speciﬁed while taking into account contemporary insights
into the human mind, and how a sequential approach of modelling and experimen-
tation can generate questions for future research.
1.1. approach to the research
In this paper an iterative approach to the research question, that of reverse engi-
neering, is adopted (e.g., Dennett, 1994; Marr, 1982). In Section 2 a guidance sys-
tem for interaction is speciﬁed based on the available literature. Following this an
empirical study is described that investigates the merits of this conceptual model.
Based on the empirical results a more detailed version of the model is proposed,
aiming to better understand the results of the study better. Although this ﬁnal
model was not formally conﬁrmed it is meant to give insight into mechanisms
leading to the observation. As such it is a stepping stone for future empirical and
modelling efforts. So rather than proposing a model and then conﬁrming it by
empirical research; the approach chosen in this paper is aimed at increasing our
understanding of how the underlying mechanisms might be working.
1.2. conceptual model of the present research
The ﬁrst stage is to specify a feedback guidance system for user-system interac-
tion with three commonly deﬁned components (Fischer, 2004): a monitoring mod-
ule, an evaluation module, and an adjustment module (Figure 1). This bears much
resemblance to previously suggested cybernetic feedback loops ﬁrst introduced in
the 1960s (see for example, Miller, Eugene and Pribram, 1960). In this paper,
we explore such a feedback system when it has to deal with a task previously
unknown to the user. In other words, we investigate how this system can accom-
plish the discovery of a successful strategy for interaction. When optimising the
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Figure 1. A computational model for regulation of user system-interaction. Besides regulation of the
interaction cycle, the reference values for evaluation and the relevant elements for monitoring and
adjustments have to be determined.
strategy for a new task, the relevant components of the interaction control system
should ‘learn’ what interaction properties to focus on. In this paper, the evalua-
tion mechanism should learn the correct reference values for the interaction pro-
cess, and the adjustment mechanism should know what elements can be adjusted
and what the effects of these adjustments will be on the interaction process. Only
when these are known, can the interaction be improved. While applying the impact
of previous experience on behaviour control, classical feedback models required
massive cognitive effort and assumed a numerical calculation and summation of
all involved values. The fact that the mind does not work with such numbers
has become increasingly clear since the early 1970s (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman,
1974). By adopting an experiential or affective component to come up with a
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feeling rather than a value, these problems with the classical feedback approach
can be overcome (Vaa, 2001), and it is this idea that is adopted in this paper.
1.2.1. Speciﬁcation of the Conceptual Model
The proposed feedback loop consists of three components that are commonly
deﬁned in cybernetic control systems (see, Carver and Scheier, 1998). The ﬁrst is a
monitoring module, which records the ongoing interaction. This is followed by an
evaluation module, which determines the quality of the ongoing interaction. Based
on the outcome of the evaluation an action is adjusted and executed.
Recent work has shown that not all evaluation follows conventions of formal
logic but is conducted by relating the current situations to a reference value in
the form of anticipated feeling (e.g., Damasio, 1994). To incorporate this idea, an
affective value is introduced as the outcome of the comparison of each element
of the interaction process with a reference value (Fischer, Blommaert and Mid-
den, 2004a). If the current situation is better than the reference a positive affect
occurs, if it is worse a negative affect occurs. These outcomes of evaluation can
be interpreted as hedonic tones (Johnston, 1999) that accumulate to a feeling of
pleasure (Cabanac, 1992) that is positive if the ongoing interaction is better than
the reference value, and negative if the ongoing interaction is worse than the ref-
erence value. Based on the evaluation of different interaction processes, the feed-
back system chooses the interaction process with the highest anticipated pleasure.
In practice this means that the adjustment mechanism will continue the ongoing
interaction if it receives positive hedonic tones, but will choose another interaction
process if the ongoing interaction results in negative hedonic tones.
1.2.2. Choosing Strategies
The way in which successful strategies can be developed through experience is illus-
trated by looking at the problem of ﬁnding the best search strategy in an unknown
situation. In an unknown situation a complete structured exploration through all
options probably is not sufﬁcient, since it is not certain whether that will result in
ﬁnding a satisfactory solution within the allowed search time. Therefore, a guid-
ance system for such a search has to put effort into achieving the interaction goal
immediately, using whatever information is available (Newell and Simon, 1972). If
too much effort is spent in working out the exact properties of the interaction, the
beneﬁts of the application may not be high enough to warrant the costs of learn-
ing how to use them. On the other hand, major beneﬁts could be missed if too
little time is spent understanding an application. Two heuristic search methods are
associated with such explorations in an unknown problem space (Winston, 1992).
The ﬁrst type is the breadth-ﬁrst search, which is the selection of different options
leading to the most knowledge about the search space. However, the breadth-ﬁrst
heuristic explores a large proportion of the possibilities, which means that it might
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take very long to ﬁnd a good solution. The second way to explore an unknown
problem space is through a depth-ﬁrst search, which is a method to continue the
search along the lines of a successful strategy without ever exploring other possi-
bilities. The drawback is that the depth-ﬁrst heuristic might follow an unsuccessful
strategy for some time before abandoning it, and after its discontinuation still lit-
tle knowledge about alternative solutions has been gathered. When ﬁrst confronted
with an unknown situation, an optimisation system can start by randomly apply-
ing one of these heuristics. The feedback system determines the success of the cho-
sen heuristic in optimising the task and, if necessary, can change it (Cohen, 1974).
In terms of the present research, the ﬁrst aim of this paper is to show that, within
a feedback loop, a simple decision rule is constantly monitored and with accu-
mulating knowledge is changed if that is necessary, thus reducing the options that
have to be explored. For simple homeostatic bodily systems such as blood pressure,
it seems obvious such regulation is derived from a simple feedback loop, or self-
regulatory adjustment system. However, there are arguments that such an auto-
mated regulation system might also play a role in more complex behaviour (Carver
and Scheier, 1998), and we will build on these ﬁndings in this paper, by deﬁning
our decision model as a feedback loop.
1.2.3. The Functions of Emotions in Behavioural Control
To be able to control the application of behavioural search heuristics, a feedback
mechanism has to be able to determine when the action taken to solve a problem
matters. In earlier studies it was shown that in well-practised interaction tasks, a
feedback system can rank different interactions on adequacy (Fischer et al., 2004a)
even when the ranking criteria are initially unknown (Fischer, Blommaert and
Midden, 2004b). One way of learning to rank criteria is when the feedback loop
accumulates prior knowledge. So instead of a ‘calculated’ optimum as an evalua-
tion reference, a shifting evaluation value consisting of prior experiences is intro-
duced (Carver and Scheier, 2000). This kind of experience-based decision making
allows comparison of situations where not all the relevant information is avail-
able as consciously experienced information. Indeed, even when people do not con-
sciously register certain stimuli, these stimuli are registered at a subconscious level
(Zajonc, 1980; Zajonc and Rajecki, 1969). Previously experienced stimuli are liked
better than others, while participants are not aware why. This is in line with ideas
that experiences have an emotional impact. In saying so, we do not wish to make
a strict cognition/emotion division. The appraisal leading to the affective liking of
a certain situation probably contains many cognitive elements (Clore and Ortony,
2000), whereas seemingly conscious logical decisions often incorporate emotional
elements (Slovic et al., 2004). That differences in prior experiences lead to different
evaluations of the same situation, and the fact that feeling is probably important
for this was shown by Mellers and colleagues (see e.g., Mellers, 2000). One of the
experiments conducted by Mellers showed that order effects of wins and losses in a
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gambling game, with a predetermined pattern of wins and losses, resulted in differ-
ences in the satisfaction of participants although they all achieved the same ﬁnal
outcome (Mellers, Schwartz and Ritov, 1999). This indicates that a continuously
updated reference value plays an important role in emotional appraisal. Dama-
sio (1994) argues that there is neurological evidence that the evaluation derived
from experience, which is not necessarily appraised emotionally, is integrated into
an emotional assessment of the value of a situation. He also argues that in situ-
ations where the logical rules cannot yet be derived, these somatic markers result
in acceptable problem solving at an earlier stage than can be achieved by follow-
ing the rules of formal logic. The idea that emotions are important was supported
by comparing two kinds of neurological patients and a control group playing a
gambling task (Bechara et al., 1994). The neurological patients differed in the type
of impairment with regard to emotional capabilities and intellectual capabilities.
One group, suffered from prefrontal damage. This group exhibited normal scores
on intelligence tests but had low emotional and social capacity. The other control
group scored far below average on intelligence tests but had normal emotions. The
results of this experiment showed that patients with prefrontal damage achieved
signiﬁcantly lower results in a gambling task, while there were no signiﬁcant differ-
ences between the control groups. The experiment by Bechara et al. (1994) shows
that emotional impairment rather than rational impairment negatively inﬂuences
this gambling task. This experiment provides evidence that emotions play a role
in indicating what options are good or bad. Once this is determined, ‘bad’ options
can be avoided and ‘good’ options selected.
To date, much of the research on the inﬂuence of emotional elements on deci-
sion making has mainly focussed on the role of emotions strictly as such a signal
of good or bad: a valenced signal. However emotions give richer signals than only
good-bad (Lerner and Keltner, 2001). Speciﬁc emotions also convey qualitative
information about how to adjust the ongoing interaction. Each affective experience
has its own speciﬁc function in the control of interaction (Oatley and Johnson-
Laird, 1987). Fear, for example, is a powerful interrupt signal that reprioritises all
current goals and frees all resources for immediate survival (Simon, 1967). Anger
is a signal that the chosen interaction strategy does not result in the desired out-
come and that additional effort has to be invested to overcome obstacles (Oatley
and Jenkins, 1996). In decision making it has been shown that happiness for exam-
ple leads to both creative solution generation but also the tendency to avoid risks,
the latter being consistent with the preservation of an optimal state, signalled by
happiness (Isen, 2000). It is in such ways that mood or emotions convey informa-
tion (Gasper and Clore, 2000; Schwarz and Clore, 1983, 2003). These speciﬁc func-
tions of emotions can be interpreted as heuristics (Epstein, 1994).
When emotions are considered as the endpoint of a process of appraisal, initial
‘good-bad’ differences precede speciﬁc changes in action readiness or basic emo-
tions (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). Adopting such an approach, the valenced
response occurs early on in the appraisal process while the more qualitative ‘basic’
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emotions emerge later on, which gives us a framework for sutdying emotional
importance within a single study.
1.3. operationalisation of the aims
In an experimental study we look for conﬁrmation of the above-mentioned ideas.
First of all, we want to know if emotions convey a good-bad signal that allow
for optimisation. To do this the reference value of Figure 1 is considered to be
similar to an anticipated outcome, i.e. a somatic marker. This reference value is
constantly updated and at the same time used to determine the quality of the
interaction. Furthermore, the idea that speciﬁc emotions give speciﬁc directions for
action adjustment also needs to be investigated. In terms of Figure 1 this means
that besides valenced information the evaluation process also generates a qualita-
tive direction for change. Since emotions allow integration of the relevant elements
of a task (Cabanac, 1992), we argue that by manipulating the emotions in a man-
ner that is unrelated to the task in hand, these emotions will nevertheless inﬂuence
the way in which interaction takes place (see for example Isen, 2000).
In the experiment we partially replicate the earlier mentioned study (Bechara
et al., 1994) of which it is generally accepted that emotion plays an important role
in the regulation of the participant’s behaviour. To investigate the potential for the
heuristic function of distinct emotions, we decided to study what kinds of effects
a potentially mood inducing procedure might have. This will give us an idea of
how to understand the control of interaction in the context of emotion-directed
control. In the second part of this paper we aim to increase our understanding of
user behaviour and adaptation by adopting a computational angle. To achieve this
aim we use the results from the experiment to build a simulation of this behav-
iour. Such a simulation can provide new insights into the structure underlying
such choices (Braitenberg, 1984) and might therefore generate directions for future
research.
2. Experiment
To test the idea of feedback in optimising a new task, an experiment was con-
ducted in which participants had try to make a proﬁt in a card game following
unknown rules. The experiment is a variation on the experiment by Bechara
and colleagues (Bechara et al., 1994). Differences between the original and this
instance of the experiment are compared in the methods section (see for a sum-
mary of differences: Table I). The main goal of the experiment was to investigate
in more detail how the accumulation of knowledge in a search task can lead to
the improvement of behaviour. Investigating this effect in a new search task, rather
than in a practised task, allowed the study of the process of optimisation.
When the game started, every element in the task could be of importance, such
as the colour of the drawn card, the deck of the card, the sequence of wins or
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Table I. Differences between the original experiment and the study reported in this paper
Bechara et al. (1994) The study in this paper
Participants N = 59 Adult americans N = 48 Dutch students of a
groups university of technology
3 3
matched groups randomly assigned to 3 music ﬁles of
n = 6 prefrontal brain damage 12min prior to the task.
n = 9 other brain damage n = 16 hardcore
n = 44 normal control n = 16 ‘summer’ pop
n = 16 melancholic
Interaction Human experimenter Computer interface
Instruction1 Hint: look at gains and losses
Card game Losses and gains handled separately Net losses and gains used
Number of loss gain combinations Number of loss gain combinations
for each deck for each deck
A: 5 A: 2
B: 2 B: 2
C: 4 C: 4
D: 2 D: 2
Starting money 2000 U$. Starting money 2 Euro.
(gross) Gains of 50 or 100 U$ (net) Gains of 1 to 10 C cents
(gross) Losses of 0 up to 1250 U$ (net) Losses of 1 up to 115 C cents
Play-money; bills of 50U$ Electronic bank account and transactions
visualised by Euro coins; indicating
experimental reward.
Monetary reward for participation equals
the amount in the bank at the end
of the experiment
1 This difference was only discovered after the experiment was conducted, see discussion of the
experimental results.
losses, etc. The only adjustment available was the selection of cards. In addition,
because the participants did not know how many cards would be drawn, they had
to ﬁnd a balance between aiming for a proﬁt early in the game or investigating
more thoroughly giving them more certainty about winning options. So, the exhib-
ited behaviour should be the result of a trade-off between spending much effort in
trying to ﬁgure out how the game works, after which informed, proﬁtable choices
can be made, and taking gambles from the start. Damasio (1994) argued that the
card selections made are based on the feeling whether the outcome of an action
is ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Early on no such anticipation exists, meaning that initially very
successful, or very unsuccessful, options might be selected. When a participant dis-
covers a successful strategy, is evaluated as being positive and this strategy is con-
tinued. The control system should interrupt un-successful interaction sequences.
To explore how emotions can inﬂuence these choices in a more qualitative
way, the emotions of participants in the experiment were manipulated indepen-
dently of the context of the task. Emotional experience is assumed to have a
regulatory function in interaction (e.g., Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1987; Sloman,
1999). This would mean that if an emotion is superimposed, the current regulation
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of the interaction is shifted towards the signal conveyed by that emotion. There-
fore, induced emotions could be a way to change the interpretation of interaction
goals in a way that is not obvious to participants. Lewis et al. (1995) showed that
simply listening to music prior to ﬁlling out a mood scale has an inﬂuence on mea-
surable effects of the mood of participants. To inﬂuence participant emotions, par-
ticipants listened to different types of music. No control condition without music
was included because it can be expected that asking a participant to sit in a silent
cabin for 12min would probably have a probably negative affective inﬂuence.
2.1. methods and materials
2.1.1. Participants and Design
Forty-eight participants, all students at Eindhoven University of Technology, took
part in the experiment. Sixteen of the participants were female and 32 were male,
with an average age of 21.6 (SD = 2.2). Mood was manipulated between partici-
pants, by exposing three groups of each 16 participants to one of the three music
ﬁles of 12min. The music ﬁles were meant to induce one of three different moods,
i.e. angry, happy, and sad (Lewis et al., 1995). Music was played before the exper-
imental task started. After the music ﬁnished, each participant played a game in
which maximum proﬁt had to be achieved by successively selecting a card from
one of four decks of cards. The total number of cards a participant selected was
100.
2.1.2. Interface and Rules of the Game
The experiment reported in this paper is a computerised variation on the exper-
iment by Bechara et al. (1994), in which is shown that intuitive, emotional con-
trol plays an essential role in the optimisation of a task. To allow easy comparison
between differences in the two instances of the experiment, Table I sums the main
differences between the study in this paper and the original study.
The experiment was fully computerised. Using Visual Basic 6.0, a graphical user
interface was built for the card game (Figure 2). The interface consisted of four
decks of cards, from now on called decks A, B, C, and D, in relation to their gain–
loss statistics. The decks were positioned in a square, the exact locations of each
deck were balanced over the participants and conditions. The interface showed a
dealer bank and a player bank, the latter was visualised simultaneously by a pile
of Euro coins and a numerical account. Furthermore, the interface had a dialogue
box at the top of the screen, in which the relevant next action was prompted.
The card game started with an animated card shufﬂe, after which all decks
showed the blank side of a card. The dialogue box instructed the participants to
select a card. After the participant had selected a card by clicking it, the card
was revealed to show either a black or a red face. The dialogue box told the
398 A.R.H. FISCHER, F.J.J. BLOMMAERT AND C.J.H. MIDDEN
Figure 2. User-interface of the card game (texts are translations from original Dutch). On top there
is a dialogue box, and under it there are four decks of cards. Left a numerical bank account and
the bank area with a pile of coins indicates the current bank account. At the bottom right is the
bank of the dealer. Above this an indicator shows as yet unpaid wins/losses.
participants whether a proﬁt or loss was made. The participants then had to
move all proﬁt from the dealer’s account to their bank by dragging the images of
Euro coins. Losses had to be dragged from the participant’s bank to the dealer’s
account. After dragging all of the required coins, the chosen card face once again
became blank and the participant was asked to draw a new card. A completed
card game consisted of a total of 100 drawn cards.
In short, the rules of the game came down to: decks A and B being ‘losing’
decks that resulted in a net loss of 25 Euro cents per 10 cards; decks C and D
being ‘winning’ decks that resulted in a net proﬁt of 25 Euro cents per 10 cards.
More speciﬁcally, the participants were given an initial balance of C2. The wins
and losses depended on the selection of a deck was selected, and were randomly
distributed within blocks of ten cards. Table II shows the different yields of the
four decks. As the participants were paid according to the outcome of the game,
the monetary values were lowered compared to the original experiment, in which
(non-paid) yields were between 50U$ and 100U$ (Bechara et al., 1994).
In the original experiment participants always received some money for a card, but
sometimes had to pay a loss as well. This rule was modiﬁed so that, instead of
separately paying winnings and asking for losses if applicable, a net outcome was
generated. The reason for this was related to computerisation of the experiment.
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Table II. Deck pay-offs per block of 10 cards
A B C D
5 × 10C cents 9 × 10C cents 5 × 5C cents 9 × 5C cents
5 × −15C cents 1 × −115C cents 1 × 2 C cents 1 × −20C cents
1 × 1C cent
3 × −1C cent
Net −25C cents Net −25C cents Net +25C cents Net +25C cents
In a pilot study it became clear that participants developed a dislike of the decks
with frequent small losses (A and C) compared to the decks with incidental large
losses (B and D). From observation and debrieﬁng we gathered that one of the
elements that was important in this dislike was the larger number of mouse oper-
ations to separately pay the losses and gains. Since drop-drag movements can be
tedious, avoiding these operations would be a sign of optimising the process, but
not one that was the focus of this study. For the same reason the net gains and
losses of option C were adjusted to prevent the occurrence of net yields of 0 C
cents, that would not result in any drag-drop operations. This made up for one of
the differences in experimental design. However, since the original experiment con-
tained similar differences in payback over the decks, no large effects were expected.
2.1.3. Procedure
Participants were recruited by approaching students during breaks, asking them
to participate in the experiment and by advertising in the hallways, so that they
could join the experiment whenever time and computers were available. The partic-
ipants were welcomed into a cognitive laboratory, where they were assigned one of
eight cabins with a PC, a 15 In. display, a standard Microsoft mouse, and stereo
headphones. Participants were assigned to one of the three conditions, based on
entrance to the lab; the 1st, 4th, 7th, etc. were assigned condition 1, the 2nd, 5th,
etc. condition 2 and the 3rd, 6th, etc. condition 3. Participants were played about
12min of music to induce different moods prior to the task (Lewis et al., 1995).
The conditions differentiated the music between three types of modern music that
can be classiﬁed as hardcore, ‘summer’ pop and melancholic rock.1 The experi-
menter gave a short verbal introduction, in which participants were told that they
would receive a reward of C2 for ﬁlling out a questionnaire on their music experi-
ence, which would be increased by however much money was in the bank at the
end of a subsequent card game. The participants listened to the assigned music
and then ﬁlled out a Dutch translation (Fischer, 2004) of the PANAS mood scale
(Watson, Clark and Tellegen, 1988) on the computer. After the participants had
ﬁlled out the scales, they were given on-screen instructions for the card game. The
1see Appendix A for the titles and performing artists of the songs
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instructions told the participants that they had to draw cards from four decks,
that the cards were randomly shufﬂed before the experiment, that each card could
generate either a proﬁt or a loss, that the game had strict rules, and that they
could make a proﬁt if they could work out these rules. No further information
was given. The participants were not told how many cards were available. After
these instructions the user interface was displayed and the game began. The order
of the decks on the screen was balanced between the participants so that each deck
occurred equally often at each position in each condition. After drawing the hun-
dredth card, the participants were asked to ﬁll in the PANAS mood scale once
more, after which they were thanked, debriefed, and paid an amount dependent
on the outcome of the game, in practice an amount between C3 and 6. The entire
experiment lasted about 35min. The actual time spent on the game was on aver-
age 6min 48 s (M = 408 s; SD = 184 s), there was no difference between the
time needed to complete the experimental task for the different music conditions
F (2, 45) = 0.2; p = 0.8.
2.1.4. Recorded Variables and Experimental Hypothesis
The items of the PANAS scale (pa1..10, na1..10) were recorded for each partici-
pant, both after the music and at the end of the card game. The overall measures
of the scales (PA, NA) were calculated. The deck and rank number of each card
was also recorded. These variables were used to determine the length of the series,
deﬁned as the number of consecutive cards drawn from the same deck.
The main task of the proposed feedback mechanism is to optimise interaction.
Although music may play a role in the detailed way in which this optimisation
occurs, it should play a secondary role to this optimisation aim. Therefore, to
determine to what amount the participants in this study managed to fulﬁl this
optimisation aim, a ﬁrst series of analyses will be conducted using the aggregated
data of all 48 participants. Only once overall applicability of feedback in this task
is established the speciﬁc effects of music are investigated.
For optimisation to occur, it should be able to determine the success of the cur-
rent interaction, which in this case is simply the monetary reward. Pleasure can be
seen as the outcome of the evaluation of the interaction (Cabanac, 1992), therefore
affective experience should be more positive if the interaction is more adequate.
Hypothesis 1: The direction of mood change during the experiment is positively
correlated with proﬁt.
Hypothesis 1 states that participants determine the success of the game by relat-
ing proﬁt to pleasure. In the speciﬁcation of the evaluation mechanism, a hedonic
tone is the outcome of the evaluation of each element of the interaction process
(Fischer et al., 2004a). In this experiment this would mean that each deck of cards
generates its own hedonic tones that are integrated in the hypothesised anticipation
for that deck (called ‘somatic marker’ by Damasio, 1994). Cards are assumed to be
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selected based on this anticipation. In other words, as long as the experience with
a certain deck of cards is better than the anticipated result of the other decks, the
feedback system should ensure that the current deck is selected again. The more
obviously proﬁtable the selected deck is, compared to the other decks, the more
stable the selections from that deck are assumed to become.
Hypothesis 2: Choices from proﬁtable decks are continued, even when the rules
of the game are unknown.
Additionally, the combination of hypotheses 1 and 2 means that if both the
length of series and change of mood are positively correlated with proﬁt then the
length of series should also be positively correlated with mood change. This co-
occurrence of a stable action pattern and positive mood agrees with the cognitive
function of happiness: signalling and stabilising adequate interaction (Oatley and
Jenkins, 1996).
However, there is a chance that a losing action sequence occurs when it is based
on initial positive experiences. The outcome of the evaluation mechanism should
decrease the anticipated proﬁt of the losing deck as the losses accumulate. At a
certain stage the feedback system should interrupt any ongoing series from a los-
ing deck and re-initiate a broader search phase among the options.
Hypothesis 3: Series of losing decks are discontinued.
There are several ways by which the control mechanism can learn to improve
the interaction, either through a lasting period of trial and error, by choosing
a good action sequence and sticking to it (hypothesis 2), or by choosing a bad
action sequence ﬁrst and abandoning it (hypothesis 3). The accumulated informa-
tion increases during the course of the experiment, which means that later card
choices should be more proﬁtable.
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between the rank number of the
card drawn and the proportion of proﬁtable cards.
The idea that emotions play a role in behaviour adjustment is investigated by
following the idea that basic emotions generate typical action adjustments (Oatley
and Johnson-Laird, 1987). Therefore by triggering different emotions, we anticipate
that the related type of action adjustment is initiated. An aggressive mood should
initiate forceful strategies to overcome obstacles (Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1987).
Or in other words, aggression is a heuristic to overcome frustration by apply-
ing force, while at the same time going for short-term beneﬁts and being insensi-
tive to losses (Evans, 2002). The function of aggression is to open up interactions
sequences that have become stuck in a dead-end street. Therefore during aggres-
sion past experience is disregarded. There is some evidence that hardcore music
invokes aggression (see, for example, Anderson, Carnagey and Eubanks, 2003).
To induce aggression we therefore asked participants to listen to several hardcore
songs.
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In the context of this game this meant that the participants who listened to
hardcore music had to draw from the decks with the highest gains. These are the
losing decks. However, losing deck A only generates a gain ﬁve out of ten times,
and results in high losses in the other ﬁve cases. This deck is soon identiﬁed as a
losing deck. Deck B, on the other hand, exhibits frequent high gains and only spo-
radic losses. Therefore participants that listened to hardcore music were expected
to favour deck B.
Hypothesis 5: The participants who listened to hardcore music initially prefer
deck B, although this is a losing deck.
As a control, two other types of music were introduced. ‘Summer’ pop music,
which might induce happiness. In problem solving, happiness leads to careful, risk-
evasive behaviour in cases where there is a chance that the interaction will decrease
the current feeling of happiness (Isen, 2000). ‘Summer’ pop should therefore lead
participants to draw cards from the ‘low risk-low gain’ decks, which is the most
proﬁtable interaction since these are the winning decks.
Hypothesis 6: The participants who listened to ‘summer’ pop music will prefer
low risk-low gain decks, and will therefore make the most proﬁt.
Finally, to control for differences between negative emotions (Lerner and
Keltner, 2001), melancholic music was played to a third group of participants.
Melancholy is most closely related to sadness, an emotion that signals that the
interaction is frustrated, but that no solution is readily available; the current goal
hierarchy would have to be reconsidered and a new approach to goals and strate-
gies would have to be initiated (Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1987). This would sug-
gest that melancholic music leads to two types of behaviour, i.e. a low-intensity
goal reprioritisation, or an aggressive search for a new strategy.
Since asking participants to sit for 12min probably inﬂuences physiological vari-
ables such as heartbeat, and asking participants to sit still without any music prior
to the task probably is too boring and thus in itself inﬂuence mood and emotions;
no condition without music was included as a control.
2.2. results
We will ﬁrst present aggregated data, to ﬁnd evidence for an overall functional-
ity of feedback in improving this task. The more subtle differences between music
conditions are studied in Section 2.2.1.
On average participants lost some of the base reward of C2 in the game, (M =
12 Euro cents loss; SD = 102 Euro cents). The greatest loss was C1.86; the highest
proﬁt was C2.44. Only a few participants expressed knowledge of the correct rules
during debrieﬁng.
A MANOVA shows that the mood of participants changes signiﬁcantly during
the experiment, F (2, 44) = 4.9, p = 0.01. The overall mood-change is negative, but
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Figure 3. Relation between proﬁt and change of positive affect.
this effect is mitigated by a positive correlation between the ﬁnal bank balance and
the change in the PA scale, r = 0.44, p < 0.01 (Figure 3). Although the NA scale
slightly decreased, this was not signiﬁcant. The participants who develop winning
strategies apparently evaluate this as positive, thus conﬁrming the ﬁrst hypothesis.
Since proﬁts strictly depended on the choice of deck, the numbers of cards from
the different decks are compared. There was a difference between the number of
cards drawn from each deck, χ2(3,N = 4800) = 339, p < 0.01. For each deck
it was tested whether the number of cards drawn from that deck differed from a
random selection (25 out 100). The losing deck A was chosen signiﬁcantly below
chance level, M = 14.9, t(47) = 10.1, p < 0.01. The losing deck B was chosen
more often than the chance level, M = 33.1, t(47) = 3.6, p < 0.01. The winning
decks C, M = 28.1, t(47) = 1.0, p = 0.30, and D, M = 24.0, t(47) = 0.5, p =
0.65, did not signiﬁcantly deviate from the chance level. The participants appeared
to notice that they should stay away from deck A, but were attracted to deck B,
although this deck should have been identiﬁed as a losing deck.
The development of choice is investigated by looking at blocks of 20 cards
(Figure 4). This showed an overall decrease in the losing decks A, F (1, 45) = 9.6,
p < 0.01, and B, F (1, 45) = 4.6, p = 0.04, as well as an increase of the winning
deck D, F (1, 45) = 6.9, p = 0.01. A trend towards an increase of cards drawn from
deck C was found, F (1, 45) = 3.0, p = 0.09. All these changes led to more proﬁt-
able card selections. This conﬁrms hypothesis 4 that, on average, the participants
develop more proﬁtable selections during the course of the experiment.
To determine whether a successful strategy has been discovered, we investigated
the length of the series of consecutive cards drawn from the same deck. The aver-
age length of a series per participant varied between 1 and 33. On average, the
participants changed decks 57 times, SD = 30. Two participants changed decks 99
times, which meant that no two consecutive cards were drawn from a single deck
throughout the entire experiment. Most participants changed decks less frequently.
One participant only changed decks for the ﬁrst two cards and then started draw-
ing from one (proﬁtable) deck, which he continued doing for the remaining 98
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Figure 4. Selected decks for blocks of 20 cards. The closed markers indicate the losing decks. The
error bar indicates the signiﬁcant difference between observations at the 0.05 level.
cards of the game. There was a signiﬁcant positive correlation between the average
length of a series and the proﬁt at the end of the game, r = 0.56, p < 0.01. This
correlation was slightly higher if the last card in the series was also the last of all
of the cards, r = 0.65, p < 0.01. Although these correlations are mostly due to the
extreme values, these ﬁndings conﬁrm hypothesis 2 that long series generally only
occur if they are proﬁtable. The higher correlation towards the end indicates that
more proﬁtable series are drawn later in the experiment. When comparing the rank
number of the card at the end of a series with the length of that series, we found
that the length of series increased during the course of the experiment, Kruskal–
Wallis H(99) = 181, p < 0.01. This, together with an increase in proﬁtable cards,
indicates that participants were starting to converge on a proﬁtable strategy.
The typical properties of longer series were studied in more detail by only con-
sidering series of 10 cards or more. Series with at least 10 cards are considerably
longer than average (M = 1.8 cards). The series of at least 10 cards are singled out
because they span a complete combination of losses and wins for a deck. There
were 34 series of at least 10 cards. Nineteen of these series were drawn from the
losing deck B, and 15 were either from winning deck C or D. When comparing
the actual length of the series containing at least 10 cards, long series from the
winning decks were signiﬁcantly longer, M = 41, than those from the losing deck
M = 16, Mann–Whitney U (n = 34) = 47.5, p < 0.01 (Figure 5).
This conﬁrms hypothesis 2, that winning series are continued, and hypothesis 3
that losing series are discontinued. Further evidence for this statement is found by
investigating the rank-number at which these series ended. Of the series from the
losing deck B, only 5 out of 19 ended after card 50, which was signiﬁcantly lower
than the 12 series out of 15 that ended after card 50 for the winning decks C and
D, χ2(1) = 4.8, p < 0.05. The 6 longest series ended at card 100; each of these
series was drawn from one of the winning decks. This conﬁrms that although the
participants occasionally generate long series of cards from the losing deck B, they
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Figure 5. Rank-number of the last cards of series. Only series of at least 10 consecutive cards from
the same deck were considered. Most losing series ended early in the experiment; proﬁtable series
continued.
Table III. Summary of the main ﬁndings for the total sample
N 48
Proﬁt M(SD) −12ns(102)
Correlation mood change and proﬁt r = 0.44∗∗
Correlation series length and proﬁt r = 0.56∗∗
Changes of deck M(SD) 57 (30)
Total Ending after Ending at average
card 50 card 100 length
Losing series >10 cards 19 5 1 16
Proﬁtable series >10 cards 15 12 8 40
A B C D
% cards from deck1 14.9∗∗ 33.1∗∗ 28.1ns 24.0ns
Change in deck choice2 D∗∗ D∗ I+ I∗∗
1Signiﬁcance levels indicate whether the number of cards selected deviates from chance (i.e.
25 cards)
2D indicates Decrease; I indicates Increase of that deck per block when determined per
group of 20 cards
nsnot signiﬁcant +signiﬁcant at .10, ∗signiﬁcant at .05, ∗∗signiﬁcant at .01
discover that drawing long series from losing decks was not a successful strategy,
while drawing long series from winning decks was. The main ﬁndings are summar-
ised in Table III.
2.2.1. Music Conditions
In the music condition the negative correlation between change in NA score and
proﬁt was not signiﬁcant for any condition. Only the positive correlation between
proﬁt and the change in PA of participants in the ‘summer’ pop condition was sig-
niﬁcant (p < 0.01; R2 = 0.55). In both the hardcore and melancholic condition this
(positive) correlation was not signiﬁcant.
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Although there were indications that the music used did indeed inﬂuence mood
(Fischer, 2004), we did not ﬁnd the anticipated emotion induction in detail. There-
fore the effects will be treated as that of music alone. Taking the limitations about
the manipulation into account, there were some small effects of the music on the
game. The differences in the ﬁnal loss and proﬁt varied slightly between the con-
ditions: hardcore (M = 57 cents loss, SD = 77), ‘summer’ pop (M = 24 cents
proﬁt, SD = 116) and melancholic (M = 2 cents loss, SD = 109), F (2, 45) = 2.6,
p = 0.09. Hypotheses 5 and 6 were conﬁrmed at a signiﬁcance level of 0.1, i.e.
that ‘summer’ pop music leads to the highest and aggressive hardcore music leads
to the lowest gain.
If the bank balance of participants is studied throughout the experiment, this
effect becomes clearer, as it is found that on average, the participants in the hard-
core condition had a lower bank account for most of the 100 cards of the exper-
iment, (repeated measure ANOVA) F (2, 45) = 5.0, p = 0.01. This means that the
participants who listened to hardcore music were initially worse off than the par-
ticipants who listened to the other music types. Later on in the experiment, they
partly recovered from their earlier losses, possibly because their initial losses were
sufﬁcient to develop a dislike to the losing deck B (see the development of deck
choices as depicted in Figure 6a).
To study the difference between music more explicitly, the number of cards
from the different decks is compared between the conditions. The number of cards
drawn from deck B was signiﬁcantly higher for the hardcore condition, χ2(2, n =
1585) = 49, p < 0.01. The participants in the hardcore condition also encountered
more losses in deck B (M = 4.4), than those in either the ‘summer’ pop, M = 2.8
or the melancholic music condition, M = 3.4, χ2(2, n = 170) = 6.2, p < 0.05. This
difference mainly occurred in the ﬁrst 20 cards (Figure 6). The participants who
had listened to hardcore music chose deck B more often in the early stages of the
game, but in doing so better learnt to avoid this deck. This conﬁrms hypothesis
5, listening to aggressive music results in high-gain, high-risk choices even if those
are loosing. There were no signiﬁcant differences between the selections of decks
A, C, or D between the conditions.
On the whole in all conditions there was a change for the better, although not
always signiﬁcant. More speciﬁcally, in all but one deck in a single condition, the
deck changes were in the expected direction (see Table IV).
There were differences in frequencies of drawn cards from the proﬁtable decks C
(χ2(2, n = 1349) = 22, p < 0.01) and D (χ2(2, n = 1150) = 22, p < 0.01) over the
conditions. In the hardcore music group decks C and D were drawn about equally
often; χ2(1, n = 705) = 1.7, ns, which was also the case for the ‘summer’ pop
group χ2(1, n = 705) = 0.4, ns. Participants who listened to melancholic music
preferred cards from deck C to cards from deck D, χ2(1, n = 858) = 24, p < 0.01.
So there is apparently only a difference between deck C and D after listening to
melancholic music. This issue is discussed later on.
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Figure 6. Deck selection for blocks of 20 cards for (a) hardcore music, (b) ‘summer’ pop music, (c)
melancholic music. The legends indicate the marker for each of the decks. Closed markers are used
for the losing decks. The error bars indicate the signiﬁcant difference between observations at the
0.05 level.
Table IV. Summary of the main ﬁndings for the music
Hardcore ‘Summer’ pop Melancholic
n 16 16 16
Proﬁt M(SD)+ −57 (77) 24 (116) −2 (109)
A B∗∗2 C D A B C D A B C D
% cards from deck 15.4 40.6 23.1 20.9 15.0 26.5 29.8 28.7 14.3 32.1 31.3 22.3
Change in deck choice1 D∗∗ D∗ I+ I∗∗ Dns Dns Dns3 Ins Dns Dns Ins Ins
1D indicates Decrease; I indicates Increase of that deck per block when determined per
group of 20 cards
2Compared between conditions
3Deviates from the hypothesised direction. This effect was four times smaller than the next
smallest effect
nsnot signiﬁcant + signiﬁcant at .10, ∗signiﬁcant at .05, ∗∗ signiﬁcant at .01
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2.3. discussion of the experimental results
2.3.1. Interpretation of the Results in Comparison with the Hypotheses
To optimise behaviour, participants have to be able to determine what the ade-
quacy of the undertaken interaction is. The positive correlation between proﬁt,
an indicator for interaction adequacy and change in the mood scores, conﬁrms
hypothesis 1, participants can evaluate their strategy. The fact that this change
could be measured on a mood scale is an indication that the evaluation is at least
partially affective. Apparently, there is information available to participants about
the adequacy of their interaction. However, it is not clear how wins and losses are
evaluated exactly. This evaluation is probably not linear, and negative outcomes are
probably evaluated as larger than similar positive outcomes (Shaﬁr and Tversky,
1995). There were indications that participants used the information they gathered
during the game to immediately improve interaction. The participants that won
the most did so by making the correct choice almost at once, which means they
could have had very little information about the rules of the game. Even with-
out being able to ﬁgure out the possibilities, the accumulation of proﬁt proved to
be enough information to stay with the chosen strategy, conﬁrming hypothesis 2
that proﬁtable series are continued. On the other hand, participants that made an
early choice for a losing deck ﬁgured out that ongoing selections from a single
deck generate a consistent loss and stopped drawing from that deck (hypothesis
3). The feedback-mechanism apparently selects a strategy of drawing continuing
series of cards from a single deck only when this strategy results in long-term
proﬁt. If losses accumulate the selection is expanded to the other options. Over the
whole group, a positive correlation between the rank number of the drawn card
and series length was found. When interpreting the co-occurrence of these ﬁnd-
ings, it becomes apparent that longer and more proﬁtable series emerge, which is
the start of convergence towards the more stable and proﬁtable strategy of select-
ing long series from the proﬁtable decks (hypothesis 4).
However, not many participants found the correct strategy to make a proﬁt in
the card game. This was mainly because the losing deck B was favoured. A possi-
ble explanation is the make-up of deck B, which gives high proﬁt and it does so
frequently (90% of the cards). On average participants encountered only 3.5 losses
in deck B compared to 29.5 wins. Apparently participants needed a lot of infor-
mation before discarding deck B.
The music did inﬂuence the number of cards drawn from the different decks.
According to hypothesis 5, aggression, should lead to exploring new strategies.
This would mean the control system should go for easy proﬁts and not be stopped
by initial losses. Hypothesis 5 was conﬁrmed by the results that participants who
listened to the hardcore music, which was used to evoke aggression, had a clear
initial preference for the deck that yielded the most frequent high wins (deck B).
Participants that listened to the ‘summer’ pop music exhibited careful risk-evasive
actions, by either sticking with proven proﬁtable decks or by staying with the
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low-risk strategy of randomly drawing cards as was predicted by hypothesis 6.
These results, however, have to be taken with some reservations because we did
not test the whether the effect of music was indeed that of an induced emotion.
It might also be the case for example that the differences found are related to
a completely other property of the music, such as its speed. To substantiate the
claims about the interpretation of the effect of music in relation to emotions, we
must carefully research whether different types of high-arousal music have different
inﬂuences on the mood of participants.
Another effect is found for participants that were exposed to melancholic music.
It was found that participants that had listened to this type of music chose signiﬁ-
cantly more often from the winning deck C than from the winning deck D. The
difference between the decks is that only low yields (5, 2, or 1C cents) and very low
losses (1C cent) occurred in deck C. A possible explanation is that participants in
this condition preferred low-intensity experiences while changing their goal prior-
ity (Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1987) and maintaining a low mental activity (Izard
and Ackerman, 2000). On the other hand, participants that listened to melancholic
music also favoured deck B. A possible explanation is that the invoked sadness
leads to the search for new goals, which can result in a period of aggression (Blum-
berg and Izard, 1986) to overcome initial obstacles. This explanation indicates that
the effect of sadness on behaviour is complex, and warrants critical examination in
future research, both with regard to the effect of sadness on decision making and
to the fundamental aspects of sadness as a basic emotion (see for example, Barr-
Zisowitz, 2000)
2.3.2. Comparison of the Results with the Original Study
A limitation for the interpretations of the behavioural measures recorded in this
experiment, is that less clear results were found than in an earlier version of the
same experiment (Bechara et al., 1994). Especially the preference for deck B in
this version of the experiment, led to a large number of losing cards. This differ-
ence cannot be attributed to the number of participants (48) alone or to the music
manipulation since at least the pattern should have emerged. Particularly since the
originally reported study found effects within the ‘normal’ control group of 44 par-
ticipants and the ‘IQ-impaired’ control group of nine participants (Bechara et al.,
1994).
There are several more conceptual factors that may have contributed to this
difference. One explanation for this observed difference is that the participants in
our experiment were students from a university of technology. The technological
environment places a heavy emphasis on rational and logical reasoning, accom-
panied by a distrust of intuition and emotion, while it was argued that intuitive
deciding is faster in this type of task (Bechara et al., 1997). The logical stance
of participants might have been increased by the fact that the experiment was
fully computerised, since a computer could give an additional logical frame for the
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experiment. This interpretation of an too large emphasis on logic is supported by
remarks of some of the participants during debrieﬁng, who were looking for com-
plex combinations of the number of consecutive wins, combined with cards of the
same colour and their relation to the size of loss and proﬁt.
A second explanation for the differences could be a motivational issue. Where a
human experimenter conducted the original experiment, our experiment was fully
computerised. This could result in a lower level of social compliance to achieve
the aims of the experiment and therefore lower motivation of participants. Lower
motivation can result in less clear relations between the available information and
behaviour (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981). To try to motivate participants, they were
actually paid according to the outcome of the game. However, for this reason the
monetary amount of the reward was adjusted. This might have had a negative side
effect by inﬂuencing the experience of wins and losses. Another adjustment to the
game might also have played a role. Yields and losses were not handled separately
but as a net value, which might have caused a vaguer interpretation of the inde-
pendent yield and loss systems of the decks.
A third point is that in our instructions no indication was given on which elements
of the game participants should focus. Schmitt, Brinkley and Newman (1999), who
also used a computerised version of the gambling task, encountered similar prob-
lems and found that the ﬁnal instructions of an earlier instance of the experiment
(Bechara et al., 1997) included unreported hints to speciﬁcally look at wins and
losses. Furthermore, in both Schmitt’s and the currently reported study, the main
difference in the procedure was that of replacing the human experimenter by a fully
computerised version of the experiment. One of the possible differences is that the
computer did not give any information on how well the participant was playing the
game other than monetary ones, where the human experimenter might have given
implicit signals about the success in the game to the participant, for example via
facial expressions. To work this out, it is highly recommended that in future work a
comparison is made between possible computerised versions (e.g., with and without
implicit feedback) and a face-to-face version of the same experiment.
2.3.3. Remaining Limitations
Although the music ﬁles did result in the expected change in the selection of cards,
there are some issues that should be resolved in future research. First and most
important there is little explicit data about the effect of the music on emotions
in the reported study. If in future work the effects of mood on this task are fur-
ther explored, attention should be paid to devise emotion manipulations that can
be measured, for example by using more discriminating self-report scales or other
measurement methods (e.g., galvanic skin resistance) to distinguish between the
different emotions. The fact that the effects that we found agree with existing the-
ories on basic emotions suggests that the approach to distinguish basic emotions
beyond the good-bad dimension alone is probably a good idea. A second issue in
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relation to the induced mood is that the music was played and ﬁnished prior to
the task. This would mean that differences in behaviour between conditions for the
ﬁrst part of the experiment are likely to be induced by the music, but that differ-
ences at the end might not be because the effect of the manipulation had faded.
On the other hand, playing the music during the task may have an inﬂuence on the
interpretation of gains and losses besides its effect on strategy selection. In future
research it might be interesting to compare effects of mood induction that ﬁnishes
before the task, and those that continue throughout the task. In the latter case a
no-music control group could be included more easily. A third issue is that it might
well be that personality traits and musical preference play an important role in the
effect of music on the participants. Although we tried to eliminate this by using
randomly sampled participant groups, this effect cannot be disregarded. For future
research it is advisable to include personality and musical preference information
in the data to compensate for this kind of effect.
2.3.4. Conclusion of the Experiment
In spite of these limitations the data supported all of the hypotheses. The mecha-
nism of card selections was well on its way to discover more proﬁtable strategies,
although it was not there yet. Furthermore, anticipated effects of anger, leading to
high-risk choices, and happiness, resulting in risk avoidance, were found. This sup-
ports the idea that heuristics of an emotional type are involved.
3. Computational Mechanisms
In the discussion of the experimental results we argued that participants in an ill-
deﬁned situation such as a card gambling game begin to learn the more proﬁt-
able strategy, even if they do not have the information required to work out the
exact rules of the game. Relating to Figure 1 this would mean that the feedback
loop inﬂuencing the experience results in an improved evaluation of the interac-
tion. To gain a better understanding of how such a system of experience-based
optimisation works, we will explore to what extent the selection of cards can be
described by a simple computational mechanism in the following section of this
paper. This approach allows us to identify potential aims for future research, which
are oriented towards underlying processes than can be derived from empirical stud-
ies alone. To achieve this aim a computational model is introduced that emulates
parts of the observed behaviour. More explicitly, we start with investigating ways
to aggregate knowledge about the different options in the experimental gambling
task. At the end of this section, the results of the experimental study are compared
to the outcome of the selection mechanism developed, and we discuss the similar-
ities and differences between the simulation and the experiment.
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3.1.1. Accumulating Experience
To achieve effective strategy selection, all mechanisms should generate some kind
of anticipation of the outcome of the next card from each deck. Following the idea
of feedback, this anticipation is constantly updated. We adopt the recent notion
of Carver and Scheier (2000) in referring to this anticipation value as ‘recalibra-
tion’ of reference values in the affect system. In future work such notions might
be further developed to link these computational ideas to neurological evidence
for similar ideas such as the ‘somatic markers’ (Damasio, 1994). As argued before,
these evaluation values require emotions in decision making. For computational or
artiﬁcial intelligence purposes emotions have been described as control and alarm
systems that hierarchically control interaction (Sloman, 1999). In a more speciﬁc
network of perceptions, actions, drives and behaviours, emotions are considered to
control the different nodes (Vela´squez, 1998). The model presented in this paper
describes a more hierarchical structure than that of Vela´squez but adopts a simi-
lar adjustment function of the separate elements of an ongoing interaction system
(see Figure 1). By placing the adjustment system outside the interaction cycle, it
combines with the hierarchic structure of Aaron Sloman (1999).
The proposed computational mechanism aggregates experience into ‘reference
values’, which is a valenced value attached to each of the options. The decision
which action to take is subsequently based on the most positive reference value.
In this case this decision is the selection of the deck from which a card is drawn.
The way in which reference values are updated and maintained is essential in the
selection of cards. Three demands must be met for this updating. First, they should
be cheap in relation to cognitive resources, which is an important issue in implic-
itly regulated tasks as we argued in the introduction. Second, to be successful in
an unknown situation the reference values should be able to adapt. This may seem
trivial, but it is not since, thirdly, such an integrator should be insensitive to ran-
dom ﬂuctuation and should therefore be as stable as possible. The balance between
the second and the third determines in particular the potential of the different inte-
grators.
With these demands, we can readily think of several ways in which the reference
values can be updated. The ﬁrst of these is to simply adopt the last occurrence of a
card as the expectation of that deck. This makes it a recency effect fully determin-
ing the content of the reference value. This mechanism requires hardly any cogni-
tive effort and is highly ﬂexible, but is also very sensitive to random ﬂuctuations,
and therefore probably not a good predictor. The reference value formed in this
way is given by Equation 1, in which the reference value (RV) for a deck at card
i of that deck is completely determined by the experience (E) of the previous card
(i − 1) drawn from that deck.
RVi = E(i−1) (1)
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A second function aggregates experience by averaging all previous experience for
a deck to form a reference value (Equation 2a). In itself this is a straightforward
way of ﬁnding the expected value of a certain option. There is, however, a prob-
lem with this approach: in the proposed model we would like to minimise the need
for cognitive resources. By using Equation 2a to calculate the average interaction
as a reference value, the system needs to store all previous experiences (E), which
results in a high cognitive load (e.g., by storing all these values in some kind of
working memory). An alternative notation that does not have this requirement is
given in Equation 2b. This notation only requires the storage of the last occurrence
and the number of occurrences. This only partially fulﬁls the demand to minimise
cognitive effort since the reduction in stored values requires a calculation that is







RVi = (i − 1) · RV(i−1) + Eii (2b)
If we want to limit the resources spent on calculation and storing past occurrences,
a third way of calculating the anticipated interaction comes to mind. Following
this method the reference value for interaction is determined by the aggregated
past experience (the present reference value). This is partially changed towards the
last interaction that occurred, through a ﬁxed relation between these two. This can
be easily modelled as an iterative Equation 3a by introducing a stability index (S,
0 ≤ S ≤ 1) that determines the extent to which the reference value depends on
the past. Note that when S equals 0, equation 1 results and that when S equals
1 the system becomes completely non-responsive to new experience. This equation
results in a reference value for the interaction that is sensitive to structural changes
but not hampered by incidental noise signals; it requires limited calculations and it
requires a storage of only a single constant (S) and the reference value. This for-
mula can be restated analytically (Equation 3b) in which some kind of exponen-
tial smoothing function is found. By comparing Equations 2 and 3, it immediately
becomes clear that the analytic function is more easily calculated in Equation 2,
whereas in Equation 3 the iterative function is more easily calculated. Therefore,
we argue that Equation 3 is probably a better way to describe the development of
reference values for the evaluation of interaction than Equation 2.




S(i−n) · (1 − S) · En (3b)
Equation 4 is a ﬁnal option that is mentioned just to make clear that more elab-
oration on these type of functions is possible is. In this equation the stability
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gradually increases as a function of the number of occurrences. Setting the param-
eter of this additional function at 0, Equation 4 reverts to Equation 3. For our
current simulation, estimating an initial value for S as well as the increase of this
parameter would require more parameter estimations than can be derived from our
evidence. Therefore, we will use Equation 3 for the remainder of this paper. In
future research it might be valuable to compare these functions with performance
of neural networks or with neurological ﬁndings. This might generate additional
ideas for such integrators, or might support the choice of one of them.
RVi = Si · RV(i−1) + (1 − Si)Ei Si = f (i) e.g., Si = i/ (i + 1) (4)
We apply these equations to a noisy signal with an average value of −3. Note here
that this is only an example to show that these functions adjust to an arbitrary
signal. All the mechanisms started off with a neutral anticipated value of 0. Each
mechanism managed to ﬁnd the average value (Figure 7). Only three of the four
introduced mechanisms reduce random noise and generate a stable, but still ﬂex-
ible, anticipation for subsequent occurrences. To obtain a ﬁrst evaluation of this
approach, we selected one formula that we related to the empirical results. As dis-
cussed above, Equation 2, although integrating prior experience, requires too much
cognitive effort for the type of mechanism we have assumed, while Equation 4 is
too complex for the aim of this paper.
3.1.2. Action Selection
In this section, the results of the experimental study are interpreted as the out-
come of a selection mechanism that enabled us to investigate to which extent the
selection of cards can be described by a proposed user model (Figure 8). The
aim of introducing this action-selection mechanism is to investigate the potential
of designing computational mechanisms that can describe successful decision pro-
cesses that follow another rationale than that of formal logic. The mechanism
selects an action, which in this case is the picking of the deck to draw a card.
The mechanism needs some knowledge of the game to select the most proﬁtable
card. To do this, the mechanism stores the anticipated outcomes of each of the
decks in what we call a reference value. This anticipation is based on previous
experiences as speciﬁed in Equation 3. The difference in anticipation is modiﬁed
by a ﬁrst parameter, called the inﬂuence of reference values on card selection. If
this parameter becomes 1, the selection is completely determined by prior experi-
ence. If this parameter becomes 0, the selection is completely random. Based on
the differences in anticipation between the decks, and the parameter for inﬂuence,
the probability that each deck will be selected is calculated, with the condition that
the overall chance should be 1 (see Table V). Decks with a better reference value
have a higher chance of being selected; the better the reference value, the higher
the chance. To prevent early deadlocking in a successful strategy, or early rejec-
tion based on a chance loss of a successful strategy, a certain level of noise is
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Figure 7. The development of a reference value over 50 consecutive interactions. (a) The develop-
ment of the reference value is modelled by Equation 1: direct response. (b) Modelled by Equation
2: averaged experience. (c) Modelled by Equation 3: ﬁxed inﬂuence of the previous reference value.
d) Modelled by Equation 4: increasing inﬂuence of the previous reference value.
added to the decision. A computer generated random number provides this noise
level. The selected deck generates an outcome similar to the one in the experimen-
tal task (see Table I). The outcome is integrated into the new reference value of
that deck. A second parameter, the stability parameter (S) of Equation 3, models
how strong the effect of past occurrences is compared to a new experience. If this
parameter is small, past occurrences are readily forgotten. If the outcome of the
deck is better than expected, the reference value for that deck increases. A positive
experience, therefore, means that the deck has a higher chance of being selected in
the next selection. A negative experience, on the other hand, results in a smaller
chance of the same deck being chosen again. The process starts over again with
the new anticipation values, so a new selection can be made. The two parame-
ters that were speciﬁed are correlated: both indicate that reference values play an
important role. The rationale for deﬁning two parameters lies in the role of the








Figure 8. The simulated mechanism with two parameters to describe the inﬂuence of experience.
Table V. Example computation of a single card selection, and the subsequent updating of
anticipation. The mechanism in this table is speciﬁed according to Equation 3a
Initial Reference RVA(i−1) = 5; RVB(i−1) = 0;
VALUE (RV(i−1)) RVC(i−1) = −5; RVD(i−1) = 0
Inﬂuence (I) of reference I = 0.5; (1 − I ) = 0.5
value on selection
Raw deck probability P = (1 − I )∗25 + I∗RV
for four decks
RAW deck probability A = 0.5∗25 + 0.5 ∗ 5 = 15;
B = 0.5∗25 + 0.5∗5 = 12.5;
C = 0.5∗25 + 0.5∗ − 5 = 10;
D = 0.5∗25 + 0.5∗5 = 12.5
Over all chance correction Overall chance = A + B + C + D = 50.
This should be 100(%) therefore
multiply all chances by factor 100/50=2
Deck probability (%) A = 30; B = 25; C = 20; D = 25
Random number (0..100) = 42 ⇒ Deck B selected
Experience (E); outcome of choice EBi = 10; E(A,C,D)i = 0
Stability index (S) - integration S = 0.8; (1 − S) = 0.2
of previous reference value
Use equation 3a to RV(A,B,C,D)I = S · RV(A,B,C,D)I + (1 − S) · E(A,B,C,D)i
calculate new reference value
New reference value RVAi = (0.8∗5 + 0.2∗0) = 4;
RVBi = (0.8∗0 + 0.2∗10) = 2;
RVCi = (0.8∗− 5 + 0.2∗0) = −4;
RVDi = (0.8∗0 + 0.2∗0) = 0
card selection procedure. This stage occurs between application of the two param-
eters. Therefore, it is not possible to reduce the model to a single parameter model.
An example of the selection of a single card and the integration of this experi-
ence into the anticipation for the next draw is computed in Table V.
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So far, we have speciﬁed a mechanism that keeps track of a single interaction
object. When several decks of cards have to be kept track of simultaneously, the
mechanism has to store more reference values (4 in this case). It is likely that some
sort of decay will occur for values that were not accessed recently; participants
are expected to forget. The simplest way to model this decay is by assuming a
neutral (0) experience for each deck that is not chosen. This leads to a system in
which non-selected negative experiences slowly revert to the neutral and once more
become eligible for subsequent selections. This could however be too stringent a
model for ‘forgetting’, since every turn in which a deck is not selected is modelled
as an effective zero result. More speciﬁc modelling of the storage system would
require even more parameters, which cannot be justiﬁed at this stage, but might be
interesting for future development. The alternative (i.e. not modelling decay of ref-
erence values at all) would generate a model that would very rapidly learn to dis-
card decks for the remainder of the simulation. The experimental data with regard
to the number of losses taken in deck B, suggests that this cannot have been the
case in the experiment. Therefore, for this simulation, this solution was selected.
With more experimental data more elegant solutions can probably be found.
Table V gives an example of how the calculation of the new reference values
for the four decks is implemented when we adopt this idea. The reference value of
deck B is adjusted to the last outcome, while the reference values of the other 3
decks move towards 0.
The task of the feedback mechanism is to direct the selections towards the most
proﬁtable. To do so, the feedback system sets the two parameters in the simulation.
The ﬁrst parameter that can be adjusted is the inﬂuence that the reference value
has on the selection of decks. The more important the ongoing tasks is for the cur-
rent well being of the person, the higher the value of this parameter should be. A
second parameter is the stability index, modelling the inﬂuence of past experiences
on the anticipation of future actions. If this parameter is high, the past occurrences
are strongly taken into account, resulting in a stable, but not so ﬂexible interaction
control.
In different situations, induced by mood differences in this case, the feedback
system should set different parameters. To test the speciﬁed card selection simu-
lation, the two parameters are estimated that ﬁt the different induced moods the
closest. It was argued that affect could be interpreted as a heuristic (Epstein, 1994)
that determines adjustments of action (Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1987). There-
fore, mood induction should result in different parameters, set by the feedback
system and based on the interpretation of the induced mood. If the function of
anger is considered, this would mean that past experience should not be taken into
account in deﬁning a new anticipation of the task. This means that the parameter
for integration of past occurrences should be lowest in ﬁtting the parameters to
the participants that listened to hardcore music.
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Table VI. Fit parameters and variance of the experimental data that is explained by the
parameters compared to random card selections
Data Explained Inﬂuence of reference Stability
variance (%) value (I) index (S)
All experimental 94% 0.15 0.74
Hardcore music 96% 0.11 0.52
‘Summer’ pop music 97% 0.17 0.84
Melancholic music 75% 0.14 0.83
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Figure 9. Example of the simulation. (a) The anticipation for each of the decks. (b) Selected card.
The parameters were those found for the ‘summer’ pop music condition.
3.2. outcome and discussion of the simulation
The simulated mechanism had to select 100 cards; this was repeated 48 times. This
resulted in a number of cards drawn from each deck. The outcome of the simula-
tion was compared with the number of cards drawn from each deck as recorded
in the experiment. By iteratively minimising the squared difference between the
empirical and the simulated data, the parameters were estimated. The simula-
tion rendered overall results that ﬁt the overall outcome of the data fairly well
(Table VI), although the data remained inherently noisy.
An idea of how the simulated selection mechanism chooses cards is given in
Figure 9. In Figure 9a the anticipated outcome is plotted for each deck at any
moment. The decay of stored reference values is clearly visible in the change of the
negative values towards the neutral over time. The experimental data with regard
to the number of losses taken in deck B suggests that some ‘forgetting’ occurs in
the experiment. Therefore this ﬁrst order solution was selected for this simulation.
With more experimental data more elegant solutions can probably be found.
Participants that listened to hardcore music had the lowest parameter for inte-
gration of the past. The stability index was also lowest. This outcome could be
interpreted as an indication that accumulating experience has little predictive value
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for the behaviour of aggressive people, which agrees with the functional idea of
aggression, ignoring past experience helps us to generate behaviour that is needed
to break through barriers (Evans, 2002). The evidence presented in the current
paper, however, is too weak too provide deﬁnitive support for this claim. This
would be an interesting direction for future research in which the relation between
aggression and past experience in decision-making tasks is further investigated.
Although the simulation could be used to predict the fraction of card selections
made by the aggregated card selection of the groups of participants, there were
limitations to the simulation with regard to predicting individual behaviour of par-
ticipants. First, in the simulation, no long series were generated, while they were
observed in the experiment. This is probably because the simulation did not distin-
guish between gambling early and going into a prolonged period of trial and error.
The problem is probably that in reality two distinct modes of selection alternate
(Sloman, 1996), whereas the simulation only had one parameter set. To overcome
this problem, the simulator can be nested in a secondary control system that qual-
itatively determines how the different heuristic or deliberate selections should be
made. This adjustment was postponed for future work because a secondary control
system would further complicate the simulation and rapidly lead to more complex
strategy generation (Dennett, 1995), which goes beyond the scope of this study.
Another limitation of the simulation was that it could not distinguish between the
two objectively equally good options C and D, which received different scores for
the melancholic music (32% versus 22%). The effect of sadness on choices was
argued to be a combination of two different strategies: preference for low inten-
sity stimuli or generating anger to start a new sequence. This problem can proba-
bly be solved by adding a secondary control system too, which determines whether
low intensity or aggressive solutions are favoured.
A ﬁnal limitation is related to the evaluation of the outcome of the game. In
this simulation it was assumed that the monetary yields were evaluated straightfor-
wardly. There is, however, evidence that negative outcomes are perceived as being
larger than corresponding positive outcomes and that extreme values are basically
perceived as ‘very big’ (Shaﬁr and Tversky, 1995), which complicates the genera-
tion of the anticipation of the next action. If these problems are dealt with a more
complete mechanism for strategy selections might be designed.
4. General Discussion
People executing an ill-deﬁned problem-solving task optimise behaviour in a way
that can be explained by a feedback system that sets parameters, determining how
the problem-solving task should be executed. To do so, the feedback system selects
strategies for the interaction. For example: “try to make proﬁt as soon as possi-
ble”, or alternatively “ﬁgure out the rules of a game to be able to make proﬁt later
on”. Participants indeed show high-risk early choices and more informed choices
later on. This indicates that the underlying psychological mechanism probably
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acts on a mix of heuristic and more deliberate solutions. This can be interpreted
as a dual process, which allows the system to select reasonable actions at every
moment (Sloman, 1996). The ongoing control ensures that heuristics resulting in
bad choices are abandoned, while those that result in successful guesses are con-
ﬁrmed. This means that good interactions are enforced by positive feedback, while
bad interactions are interrupted by negative feedback. With increasing information
about the task, a more stable action selection emerges.
Emotions as information probably play a role in the feedback system. Although
it was not completely clear how the music inﬂuenced the mood of participants,
the induced change in mood resulted in different strategies, which indicates that
the outcome of the evaluation is at least partially affective and that mood induc-
tions inﬂuence strategic decisions. This idea should be substantiated through future
research on the inﬂuence of music on self-reported mood and the exact measure-
ment of this inﬂuence. The decreasing effect of the mood manipulation in the
experimental results indicates that mood induction is most important at the start
of the experimental task, when the simple emotion as a heuristic is the only avail-
able cue and therefore is apparently used as a start for the search process. Later, as
more information has been gathered, the effect of mood induction diminishes and
the chosen actions are based on strategies that have been generated by the feed-
back system with accumulating experience. We cannot exclude, however, that part
of this effect is due to the dissipation of the initially induced mood.
To achieve a better understanding of the regularities involved in such an intu-
itive interaction optimisation task, we presented four ways to integrate experience
in an anticipated outcome for an interaction. We compared the iterative and ana-
lytic functions. By rearranging the equations, the functions are shown to be iden-
tical, although simple analytic ones were not always simple iterative functions and
vice versa. Under the assumption that a simple function is better than a complex
one, we chose a function that was simple when iterative. We chose for an iterative
function because it is most likely to be related to the emergence of associations in
neural networks or indeed the brain, although this should be conﬁrmed by future
and neurological research. Using one of these iterative functions to produce refer-
ence values, we simulated the card choices of participants. This simulation gener-
ated similar fractions of cards from the decks as those found in the experiment.
However, the simulation did not generate the same gaming strategies (e.g., length
of series or frequency of changes) as the individual participants. This is attributed
to a limitation of the simulated mechanism, which only uses one mode of pro-
cessing, whereas participants possibly use intuitive, heuristic and rational processes
(Bechara et al., 1997; Sloman, 1996).
The approach of sequential modelling and experimenting gives a ﬁrst hint on
how accumulating experience can be modelled in the prediction of the discovery of
successful interaction strategies. If this understanding is implemented in the design
and development of interactive systems, it might be possible to build applications
that allow the users to learn to operate the application with less effort spent on
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the actual learning process. To fully understand this way of adopting new inter-
action, we recommend further research (see also the discussion of the experiment
and the discussion of the computational simulation) in which the combination
between cognitive science (for example, Newell, 1990) and contemporary insights
from intuitive action control as suggested in neurological research (for example,
Damasio, 1994) and psychology (for example, Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1987;
Sloman, 1996) are combined to determine a more speciﬁc description of this type
of adaptations. Once this effort has been undertaken, applications designed accord-
ing to these ideas might lead to more efﬁcient and effective learning as well as
higher user satisfaction.
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Appendix A: Music ﬁles
Three music ﬁles were compiled to induce different moods. The amplitudes of
loudness of the different tracks were equalised so all tracks were of approximately
equal loudness.
Music tracks that were used to manipulate participant mood
Condition Length Tracks Band Year
1 Hardcore 12.42 Bombtrack Rage against the Machine 1992
The Future of War Atari Teenage Riot 1997
Killing in the Name Rage against the Machine 1992
2 ‘Summer’ pop 13.17 Surﬁn’ U.S.A. Beach Boys 1963
I shot the Sheriff Bob Marley 1973
Night Boat to Cairo Madness 1982
Brazilian Love Song Steelbands of the Caribbean 1996
3 Melancholic 12.48 Fatal Wound A Minor Forest 1999
The Eternal Joy Division 1980
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